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Some tax laws are worse than others. The 1986 Tax Reform Act is generally considered one of the best.1 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is generally considered
one of the worst, although I would say it is too early to tell what its long-term
impact might be, and some of its worst features (like the Code Sec. 199A deduction) might be repealed in the future.2
Another example of a generally condemned tax law is the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004.3 This law was a must-pass piece of legislation because
Congress needed to react to the sanctions imposed upon the United States by
the EU as the result of its victory in the ETI litigation at the WTO. The AJCA
included such beauties as a temporary participation exemption that did not
create any jobs, a significant increase in the potential for cross-crediting in the
foreign tax credit, a manufacturing deduction that extended to software and film
production, and a deeply flawed anti-inversion rule that immediately gave rise to
a second wave of inversions.4
But these bad features were not particularly lasting. The participation exemption only lasted one year, the cross-crediting provisions were significantly revised
in 2017, the manufacturing deduction was repealed in 2017, and the anti-inversion provision became less relevant after 2017. Any damage that was done was
temporary.
To get to a bad tax law whose effects were really long-lasting, one should go
much farther back to the Revenue Act of 1918. This law was the last major tax
law of the Wilson administration, but despite its name was only enacted in
1919 and therefore was the first post-war tax law. During WW1 the income
tax had grown from a largely symbolic measure with rates in the single digits
to the major revenue source of the Federal government, with a top individual
tax rate of 77%. The Revenue Act of 1918 maintained the high rate for 1918
but reduced it for 1919 and 1920. This reduction was the work of the GOPcontrolled Senate and reflected the desire to return to “normalcy” after the war
ended. As a contemporary article explained:
The Revenue Act of 1918 which was signed by the President February
24, 1919, is the fourth great revenue measure of a notable series enacted
during the present administration. The long delay in its passage has greatly
© 2021 R. Avi-Yonah
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handicapped the Treasury Department in the administration of collection and has been a cause of uncertainty and annoyance to business and taxpayers of
all classes. In May, 1918, the President addressed the
Congress urging that body to give prompt attention
to this problem even at the cost of the customary
summer vacation; on June 5, the Secretary of the
Treasury advised Mr. Kitchin, chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee, that the bill should provide
for raising eight billion dollars, one third of the estimated expenses of the government for the coming
year on a war basis; on September 3, the committee
presented to the House of Representatives a bill estimated to raise this amount. In presenting his report
Mr. Kitchin said: “In making the decision to recommend that one third of the expenditures for the
current year be raised by taxes and two thirds from
the sale of bonds, your Committee has been guided
by conditions existing at the present time.” The bill
was passed by the House September 20, and the next
day was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Finance.
The [Democratic majority] House increased existing
tax rates, added new taxes and evinced some appreciation of the desirability of raising a substantial part
of the government’s requirements by taxation. But
its hasty action and the radical revision of its bill
by the Senate in connection with the Revenue act
of 1917 led the public to expect similar results in
connection with this measure so that it discounted
the House bill and looked forward to the [GOP majority] Senate’s action.
While the measure was under consideration by the
Senate Committee two important events occurred
which necessitated changing plans. One was the passage of an act regulating the sale and manufacture
of alcoholic beverages from July 1, 1919, until after
the demobilization of the army. This prohibition
measure reduced the estimated yield from the tax
on beverages by 500 million dollars. The other event
was the signing of the armistice, which brought with
it a reduction in the estimated expenditures of the
government from approximately 24 billion dollars
to 18 billion dollars. As a result, the bill as submitted
to the Senate provided for raising 6 billion dollars.
“Taxes which can be easily borne amid the feverish activity and patriotic fervor of war times are neither so
welcome nor so easily sustained amid the uncertainties,
the depreciating inventories and the falling markets
46
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which are apt to mark the approach of peace,” said
Mr. Simmons in his report upon presenting the bill
to the Senate December 6. After the bill had been
passed by the Senate and while it was in conference,
the Department of State announced that the prohibition amendment to the Constitution had been
ratified by the requisite number of states so that
the estimated yield of the new measure was again
reduced by over half a billion dollars.
The chief objection to the bill on the part of the
Senate [Democratic] minority when it was before
that branch of Congress was to the provision which
fixed the rates for 1920. They argued that it was advisable to wait until conditions for that year could be
ascertained, while the [GOP] majority held that the
taxpayers were entitled to know in advance what they
were to pay. Another consideration which the advocates of this provision might well have mentioned is
the administrative advantage of being able to plan for
the collection of the tax. Senator La Follette presented
a report in which he made a plea for increasing the
amount to be raised by taxation, and for eliminating
the proposed taxes on occupations, amusements (especially the cheaper kind), freight and passenger rates,
and consumption taxes generally, substituting therefore a heavy tax on luxuries and war excess profits.
Senator Smoot presented some additional views in
which he advocated raising practically the entire revenue from a 1 per cent sale tax on consumption goods.
Senator Thomas described the excess profits feature as
“arbitrary, unjust, and indefensible” and objected to
the inheritance tax on the ground that it was an encroachment upon the taxing power of the states.
The Senate finally passed the bill December 23.
About six hundred changes had been made in the
House bill, hence the Conferees had a difficult undertaking. The greatest difficulties were with the
rates of the excess profits tax. The Conferees managed to reach an agreement on February 1 and the
bill was signed by the President and became law
February 24.5
What the article does not mention were two important
background facts. First, President Wilson was in Europe
for the Paris peace conference during the whole period
that the act was debated in the Senate. Second, there was
an influenza pandemic sweeping the country, so that regular Americans (who were in any case not subject to the
income tax) were not paying attention. These conditions
January–February 2021

paved the way for rampant lobbying by corporate and
other interests that resulted in major provisions being
added to the bill. Those provisions represent some of the
worst tax rules ever enacted, but because they were very
pro-taxpayer, they are all still with us over a century later.
In what follows, I will focus on four: Tax-free reorganizations, percentage depletion, the foreign tax credit, and
consolidated returns.

2. Tax-Free Reorganizations
Section 202 of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided as
follows:
SEC. 202. (a) That for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived or loss sustained from the sale
or other disposition of property, real, personal, or
mixed, the basis shall be—
(1) In the case of property acquired before March
1, 1913, the fair market price or value of such
property as of that date; and
(2) In the case of property acquired on or after that
date, the cost thereof; or the inventory value, if
the inventory is made in accordance with section 203.
(b) When property is exchanged for other property,
the property received in exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss be treated as the
equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market
value, if any; but when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation a
person receives in place of stock or securities owned by
him new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par
or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur
from the exchange, and the new stock or securities received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock,
securities, or property exchanged.
When in the case of any such reorganization, merger or
consolidation the aggregate par or face value of the new
stock or securities received is in excess of the aggregate
par or face value of the stock or securities exchanged,
a like amount in par or face value of the new stock or
securities received shall be treated as taking the place of
the stock or securities exchanged, and the amount of the
excess in par or face value shall be treated as a gain to
the extent that the fair market value of the new stock or
securities is greater than the cost (or if acquired prior to
January–February 2021

March 1, 1913, the fair market value as of that date)
of the stock or securities exchanged.
This was the origin of all subsequent tax-free reorganizations provisions.
There are several obvious problems with this provision.
First, the crucial terms “reorganization, merger or consolidation” are not defined, and it was left for Treasury to
define them by regulation. Regulation No. 45, promulgated pursuant to the 1918 Act, eventually outlined the
types of transactions that were eligible for this nonrecognition treatment to include cases where:
corporations unite their properties by either (a) the
dissolution of corporation B and the sale of its assets
to corporation A, or (b) the sale of its property by B
to A and the dissolution of B, or (c) the sale of the
stock of B to A and the dissolution of B, or (d) the
merger of B into A, or (e) the consolidation of the
corporations.6
Second, the limitation to par value was already in 1919
meaningless because corporations could issue no-par
stock. The key issue was not the par value but the fair
market value, and that was not addressed.
Third, and most shockingly from a modern perspective, there was no limit on “boot,” or cash, that could
be received in the transaction, so that an exchange could
qualify for tax-free treatment even if it was mostly a
sale for cash. It is not even clear whether the cash portion would be taxable: The language “when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation
of a corporation a person receives in place of stock or
securities owned by him new stock or securities of no
greater aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall be
deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock
or securities received shall be treated as taking the place
of the stock, securities, or property exchanged” can also
be read literally to include the cash portion in the “no
gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange,
especially since in 1919 it was not clear that capital gains
were “income.”
Finally, the entire provision ran counter to the spirit of
the original corporate tax of 1909, which was designed
to place limits on monopolization.7 Tax-free mergers,
especially those in which a large corporation acquires a
smaller competitor, run directly counter to this spirit, as
many subsequent commentators have pointed out.8
What was the rationale for the tax-free reorganization provision? Prof. Steven Bank has argued that it
was crafting a compromise between an accrual model
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of taxation (in which capital gains are taxed when they
occur) and a consumption or cash flow model (in which
capital gains are only taxed when they are consumed).9 But
this is a very modern view of the debate, and does not explain the departure from the regulatory goals of the 1909
act. In addition, the debate about realization that culminated in the Supreme Court’s Eisner v. Macomber decision
(1920) and the capital gains cases (1921–1925) both happened after the original enactment of the reorganization
provision in 1919, and therefore were not relevant to it.
Jerome Hellerstein was right in pointing out that there was
nothing in the original corporate or individual income tax
that required such generous treatment of mergers.10 The
provisions should be seen, as Hellerstein implied, as reflecting the influence of lobbying by the corporations and
their wealthy shareholders, especially since it was not limited to stock consideration. Nevertheless, they are still in
the Code (Code Sec. 368), even though they are now viable under both Supreme Court case law and regulations
only if they have at least 40% stock consideration.

3. Percentage Depletion
Section 214 of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided as
follows:
SEC. 214. (a) That in computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions: …
(10) In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other
natural deposits, and timber, a reasonable allowance
for depletion and for depreciation of improvements,
according to the peculiar conditions in each case,
based upon cost including cost of development not
otherwise de- ducted: Provided, That in the case of
such properties acquired prior to March 1, 1913, the
fair market value of the property (or the taxpayer’s
interest therein) on that date shall be taken in lieu
of cost up to that date: Provided further, That in the
case of mines, oil and gas wells, discovered by the taxpayer, on or after March 1, 1913, and not acquired as
the result of purchase of a proven tract or lease, where
the fair market value of the property is materially disproportionate to the cost, the depletion allowance shall
be based upon the fair market value of the property at
the date of the discovery, or within thirty days thereafter; such reasonable allowance in all the above
cases to be made under rules and regulations to be
prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval
of the Secretary. In the case of leases the deductions
48
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allowed by this paragraph shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee.
This provision is unique because unlike any other form of
cost recovery in the Code, it permits taxpayers (both individual and corporate) to deduct a depletion allowance
in excess of their cost of acquiring the property. In 1925,
the provision was amended to provide for percentage
depletion. Percentage depletion has been roundly condemned throughout its history as a pure tax subsidy to
the oil and gas industry, but it is of course still with us
(Code Sec. 613).11

4. The Foreign Tax Credit
Section 238 of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided as
follows:
SEC. 238. (a) That in the case of a domestic corporation the total taxes imposed, for the taxable year by
this title and by Title III shall be credited with the
amount of any income, war-profits and excess-profits taxes paid during the taxable year to any foreign
country, upon income derived from sources therein,
or to any possession of the United States.
If accrued taxes when paid differ from the amounts
claimed as credits by the corporation, or if any tax
paid is refunded in whole or in part, the corporation
shall at once notify the Commissioner who shall redetermine the amount of the taxes due under this
title and under Title III for the year or years affected,
and the amount of taxes due upon such redetermination, if any, shall be paid by the corporation upon
notice and demand by the collector, or the amount
of taxes overpaid, if any, shall be credited or refunded
to the corporation in accordance with the provisions
of section 252. In the case of such a tax accrued but
not paid, the Commissioner as a condition precedent to the allowance of this credit may require the
corporation to give a bond with sureties satisfactory
to and to be approved by him in such penal sum
as he may require, conditioned for the payment by
the taxpayer of any amount of taxes found due upon
any such redetermination; and the bond herein prescribed shall contain such further conditions as the
Commissioner may require.
(b) This credit shall be allowed only if the taxpayer
furnishes evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner
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showing the amount of income derived from sources
within such foreign country or such possession of the
United States, as the case may be, and all other information necessary for the computation of such credit.
(c) If a domestic corporation makes a return for a
fiscal year be- ginning in 1917 and ending in 1918,
only that proportion of this credit shall be allowed
which the part of such period within the calendar
year 1918 bears to the entire period.
This is the origin of our current direct foreign tax credit
(Code Sec. 901). The foreign tax credit (“FTC”) has
been the subject of much criticism by various academics
such as Prof. Graetz, Prof. Shaviro, Prof. Hines and Prof.
Shaheen.12 I have been more sympathetic because of the
role the FTC played in enabling the international tax regime to be created in the 1920s. But even I would acknowledge that a refundable credit for foreign taxes that
reduces U.S. tax liability dollar for dollar and therefore
creates no incentive for the taxpayer to reduce foreign
taxes is a very generous unilateral measure. Moreover,
what is most striking in the 1918 version of the FTC is
that it is not limited to the U.S. tax rate, and so if the
foreign country increases its tax rate, it can do so at the
expense of the U.S. Treasury that would be obligated to
issue the taxpayer a bigger refund. This state of affairs only
lasted until 1921, but it illustrates more than any other
provision how pro-taxpayer the Revenue Act of 1918 was.

5. Consolidated Returns
Section 240 of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided as
follows:
SEC. 240. (a) That corporations which are affiliated within the meaning of this section shall, under
regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner
with the approval of the Secretary, make a consolidated return of net income and invested capital
for the purposes of this title and Title III, and the
taxes thereunder shall be computed and determined
upon the basis of such return: Provided, That there
shall be taken out of such consolidated net income
and invested capital, the net income and invested
capital of any such affiliated corporation organized
after August 1, 1914, and not successor to a then
existing business, 50 per centum or more of whose
gross income consists of gains, profits, commissions, or other income, derived from a Government
January–February 2021

contract or contracts made between April 6, 1917,
and November 11, 1918, both dates inclusive. In
such case the corporation so taken out shall be separately assessed on the basis of its own invested capital
and net income and the remainder of such affiliated
group shall be assessed on the basis of the remaining
consolidated invested capital and net income.
In any case in which a tax is assessed upon the basis
of a consolidated return, the total tax shall be computed in the first instance as a unit and shall then be
assessed upon the respective affiliated corporations
in such proportions as may be agreed upon among
them, or, in the absence of any such agreement, then
on the basis of the net income properly assignable
to each. There shall be allowed in computing the
income tax only one specific credit of $2,000 (as
provided in section 236); in computing the
war-profits credit (as provided in section 311) only
one specific exemption of $3,000; and in computing
the excess-profits credit (as provided in section 312)
only one specific exemption of $3,000.
(b) For the purpose of this section two or more domestic corporations shall be deemed to be affiliated
(1) if one corporation owns directly or controls
through closely affiliated interests or by a nominee
or nominees substantially all the stock of the other
or others, or (2) if substantially all the stock of two
or more corporations is owned or controlled by the
same interests.
(c) For the purposes of section 238 a domestic corporation which owns a majority of the voting stock
of a foreign corporation shall be deemed to have
paid the same proportion of any income, warprofits and excess-profits taxes paid (but not including taxes accrued) by such foreign corporation
during the taxable year to any foreign country or to
any possession of the United States upon income derived from sources without the United States, which
the amount of any dividends (not deductible under
section 234) received by such domestic corporation
from such foreign corporation during the taxable
year bears to the total taxable income of such foreign corporation upon or with respect to which such
taxes were paid: Provided, That in no such case shall
the amount of the credit for such taxes exceed the
amount of such dividends (not deductible under
section 234) received by such domestic corporation
during the taxable year.
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This provision stemmed from Regulation 41, Articles 77
and 78, of the War Revenue Act of 1917, which gave the
Commissioner authority to require related corporations to
file consolidated returns “whenever necessary to more equitably determine the invested capital or taxable income.”13
The provision was designed as a tax avoidance prevention
measure in order to protect the excess profits tax on corporations from being manipulated by splitting up affiliated
corporations, since in that way the excess would be lower
and the credit for capital invested would be higher. The
definition of affiliated corporations is very broad and similar to current Code Sec. 482 (which was enacted when
mandatory consolidation was repealed in 1928). Notably,
foreign corporations are not included in consolidation, a
problem that is still with us (if they were, the whole deferral
vs exemption debate would have looked very different).
Also note the invention of the indirect foreign tax credit
(also still with us in Code Sec. 960) in the last sub-section.
Despite the anti-avoidance nature of this provision, it
too runs contrary to the anti-monopolization spirit of
the corporate tax of 1909, because it encourages acquiring loss corporations to offset the profits of the acquiring corporation (a practice only first limited in 1969).

Moreover, in 1928 consolidated returns were made elective, and that rule has been with us ever since (Code Sec.
1504). More than any other provision of the Code, consolidated returns encourage the growth of monopolies
because it allows for offsetting the losses of some companies against the profits of their affiliates while maintaining limited liability.

6. Conclusion
These are only a few examples of the extreme pro-taxpayer features of the Revenue Act of 1918. Others could
be added (e.g., the original excise tax on the gross premium income foreign insurers of U.S. risks, now Code
Sec. 4371, designed to protect U.S. insurers from foreign
competition, and the unlimited corporate interest deduction, the source of many later problems).14 The lesson
for Congress should be, do not enact tax laws when nobody is looking.15 Since we are now again in the midst of
a global pandemic, this is a useful lesson to remember as
Congress spends trillions of dollars in an attempt to bolster our faltering economy.

ENDNOTES
1

2

3

50

See, e.g., Andrew Chamberlain, Twenty Years
Later: The Tax Reform Act of 1986, The Tax
Foundation (Oct. 23, 2006): “Yesterday marked
the 20th anniversary of the nation’s most recent federal tax overhaul—the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. Although much of what that reform
accomplished has been unwound over the
years by lawmakers eager to reward constituents with tax preferences, it stands as a rare
example of bipartisan support for fundamentally sound tax policy.”
On Code Sec. 199A, see Shaviro Daniel,
Evaluating the New US Pass-Through Rules,
British Tax Review, Issue 1, Mar. 15, 2018; NYU
Law and Economics Research Paper No. 18-08;
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper
No. 18-25, available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3141521. On the 2017 tax reform as
a whole see R.S. Avi-Yonah, How Terrible Is
the New Tax Law? Reflections on TRA17, U of
Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 586;
U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No.
18-002, Jan. 2, 2018, available at SSRN https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3095830 or http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.3095830.
See, e.g., Hui Chen, Katherine Gunny and
Karthik Ramanna, Return on Political
Investment in the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, HBS Working Paper (Dec. 30, 2014): “What
are the real economic returns of corporate
political spending? Here the authors apply a
more rigorous approach for a clearly delimited

INTERNATIONAL TAX JOURNAL

4

time period by examining the returns to corporate political spending on what became the
American Jobs Creation Act (‘the AJCA’) of 2004.
Findings differ sharply from those generated
in prior studies. Specifically, for the median
politically active firm in the sample 1) an increase in $1 million in lobbying expenditures
is associated with about $32.35 million in
taxes saved; 2) an increase in $100,000 of PAC
contributions is associated with about $15.64
million in taxes saved; and 3) the additional
filing of ten tax-related lobbying reports is
associated with about $21.08 million in taxes
saved. These results are particularly relevant in light of continued corporate attempts
to generate support in the Congress for another ‘one-time’ tax break on repatriated
foreign income in line with the AJCA of 2004.
Overall, the study suggests that the very high
returns to political investment heralded in the
press—obtained through descriptive methods—are, in fact, nearly an order of magnitude
smaller when more rigorously estimated via
instrumentation.”
See Code Secs. 199, 965, 904 and 7874, as added
or amended by AJCA. On Code Sec. 199 see CRS,
The Section 199 Production Activities Deduction:
Background and Analysis (July 6, 2017). On Code
Sec. 965 see, e.g., Donald J. Marples & Jane G.
Gravelle, Tax Cuts on Repatriation Earnings
as Economic Stimulus: An Economic Analysis
(CRS, May 27, 2011). On Code Sec. 904 see, e.g.,

5

6

7

8

9

10
11

12

Kimberly Clausing, Options for International
Tax Policy After the TCJA (CAP, Jan. 30, 2020).
On Code Sec. 7874 see, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Reflections on the “New Wave” Inversions and
Notice 2014-52, 145 Tax Notes 95 (Oct. 6, 2014);
76 Tax Notes Int’l 63 (Oct. 6, 2014).
Roy G. & Gladys C. Blakey, The Revenue Act of
1918, 9 Amer. Econ. Rev. 213 (1919).
Reg. §45, art. 1567, 21 T.D. 170, 395 (1919).
Importantly, this rule was not limited to stock
consideration.
See Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the
State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 1193 (2004).
See, e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, Mergers,
Taxes, and Realism, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 254 (1957);
Milton Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to
“Reorganizations”, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 98 (1938).
Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical
Realism, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
Hellerstein, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Johnson, Calvin Harsha, Accurate and
Honest Tax Accounting for Oil and Gas, 125
Tax Notes 5, 573–583 (Nov. 2, 2009); The Shelf
Project, available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1503574.
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The
Original Intent of US International Taxation,
46 Duke L. J. 1021 (1996); Daniel Shaviro, The
Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. Legal

Continued on page 68
January–February 2021

58
59
60
61
62

63
64
65
66

67

68

69
70

71

72
73

74

68

Reg. §1.385-4(b)(6).
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(3)(i).
Reg. §1.385-4(b)(1).
Reg. §1.385-3(b)(3)(iii)(A).
FP is deemed to transfer the note to USCo
alone because only USCo made a regarded
distribution triggering the funding rule. Reg.
§1.385-3(f )(4)(iii).
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(4)(iii).
See Reg. §1.385-3(h) Ex. 16.
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(5)(i).
Reg. §1.385-3(f)(5)(iii). Whether a transaction is
a specified event is determined “immediately
after the transaction and taking into account
all related transactions.”
Reg. §1.385-3(f)(5)(iii)(A). For instance, if DSub
in the example transferred its interest in PRS
to a foreign subsidiary of FP, the transfer
would be a specified event, even though PRS
continues to be a controlled partnership,
because the foreign subsidiary, although a
member of the expanded group, is not a covered member (domestic corporation).
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(5)(iii)(B). More specifically, this
specified event occurs if the holder-in-form
and deemed holder cease being members
of the same expanded group for a reason
described in Reg. §1.385-3(d)(2).
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(5)(iii)(C).
Reg. §1.385-3(f)(5)(iii)(D). This rule applies
whether the transfer is direct or indirect
“through one or more partnerships.”
If an expanded group partner transfers
only a portion of its interest in a controlled
partnership, only a portion of the expanded
group partner’s deemed transferred receivable “ is deemed to be distributed in redemption of an equal portion of the deemed
partner stock.” This portion equals the entire
principal amount of the transferred receivable
deemed held by the expanded group partner,
multiplied by a fraction. The numerator of the
fraction is “the portion of the expanded group
partner’s capital account attributable to the
interest that is transferred,” and the denominator of the fraction is the partner’s entire
capital account immediately before the specified event. Reg. §1.385-3(f)(5)(iv).
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(5)(iii)(F). If a holder-in-form
transfers a disregarded debt instrument to
a member of the expanded group or a controlled partnership, the transfer is not a specified event, but the holder-in-form is deemed
to transfer the retained receivable and the
deemed partner stock to the transferee. Reg.
§1.385-3(f )(4)(v).
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(5)(i).
Reg. §1.385-3(f)(5)(i). This rule does not apply
if any portion of a deemed transferred receivable is deemed to be retransferred under Reg.
§1.385-3(f )(5)(ii), discussed infra text accompanying note 75.
Reg. §1.385-3(f )(5)(iii)(E). This rule applies
whether the transfer is direct or indirect
through one or more partnerships. For a

INTERNATIONAL TAX JOURNAL

75
76

transfer of less than all of a partnership interest, see Reg. §1.385-3(f)(5)(iv), discussed
supra note 70.
Reg. §1.385-3(f)(5)(ii).
See Reg. §1.385-3(h) Ex. 17.
6

Tax Developments in the
Cayman Islands
Continued from page 44

7

Islands. For example, the EU’s decision
of removing the Cayman Islands from
the EU Blacklist should be welcomed.
However, businesses and investment
fund groups having the Cayman
Islands entities in their group structures
should still stay alert, as the removal of
a blacklisted jurisdiction from the EU
Blacklist does not necessarily mean
the removal from a “local” blacklist in
an EU member state. Relevant stakeholders should stay vigilant and react
promptly in line with the tax developments in such jurisdictions.

8

9

10

The Worst Tax Law Ever
Enacted?

ENDNOTES
* Dr. Ng has been teaching in universities in
Hong Kong, primarily in the fields of taxation and corporate governance. She had also
worked for Big-4 accounting firms in their
taxation and corporate advisory services divisions. The author can be reached by phone at
(852) 3917 4213 or by email at christinang@
hku.hk.
1
OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue, www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/taxation/harmf ul-tax-competition_
9789264162945-en.
2
OECD (2015), Countering Harmful Tax
Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account
Transparency and Substance, Action 5—2015
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting Project, https://doi.org/10.1787/
9789264241190-en.
3
OECD (2018), Resumption of Application
of Substantial Activities Factor to No or
Only Nominal Tax Jurisdictions—Inclusive
Framework on BEPS: Action 5, www.oecd.org/
tax/beps/resumption-of-application-of-substantial-activities-factor.pdf.
4
Official website of Department for International
Tax Corporation, Cayman Islands Government,
www.ditc.ky/es/es-legislation-resources/.
5
Cayman Islands International Tax Co-operation
(Economic Substance) Law (2020 Revision),

Supplement No.3 published with Legislation
Gazette No. 5 dated 14 January 2020, www.
ditc.ky/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/The_
International_Tax_Cooperation_Economic_
Substance_Law_2020_Revision.pdf.
Cayman Islands International Tax Co-operation
(Economic Substance) (Amendment) Law,
2020 (Law 7 of 2020), Supplement No.4 published with Legislation Gazette No. 10 dated
12 February, 2020, www.ditc.ky/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/International_Tax_Cooperation_Economic_SubstanceAmendment_
Law_2020.pdf.
Cayman Islands Tax Information Authority,
Economic Substance for Geographically Mobile
Activities Guidance, Version 3.0, www.ditc.ky/
wp-content/uploads/Economic_Substance_-_
Guidance_-_v3.0190713.pdf.
Official website of Department for International
Tax Cooperation, Cayman Islands Government,
www.ditc.ky/es/es-legislation-resources/.
Ministry of Financial Services of the Cayman
Islands Government, Update on Economic
Substance Forms, www.mfs.ky/news/industry-advisory/update-on-economic-substanceforms/.
Department for International Tax Cooperation,
Cayman Islands Government, DITC portal,
https://ditcportal.secure.ky/login.

Continued from page 50

13

14

15

Analysis 65 (2011); James Hines, Reconsidering
the Taxation of Foreign Income, 62 Tax L. Rev.
269–298, (2009); Fadi Shaheen, International
Tax Neutrality: Revisited, 64 Tax L. Rev. 131
(2011).
T.D. 2694, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 294, 321 (1918).
See also War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40
Stat. 300 (1917).
On the interest deduction see Steven A. Bank,
Historical Perspective on the Corporate Interest
Deduction, 18 Chapman Law Review 29 (Mar. 24,
2014); UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research
Paper No. 14-04, available at SSRN https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2413968; on the later problems from an unlimited interest deduction see
Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the Corporate Tax,
44, 48 (2009); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate
Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 Yale
L. J. 1585, 1585 (1974).
Arguably, the same was true when AJCA was
enacted in October 2004; because of the
war in Iraq and the focus on the impending
presidential election, nobody paid much attention to the “Christmas tree” nature of the
legislation.

January–February 2021

Reproduced with permission of copyright owner. Further reproduction
prohibited without permission.

